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EMOTIONS, RISK PERCEPTIONS
AND BLAMING IN 9/11 CASES*
Neal R. Feigenson'
Emotions combine with cognition to shape our
perceptions, memories and judgments. Social psychologists
have conducted many studies, especially in the last fifteen
years or so, seeking to identify the roles of affect in social
judgments, including legal judgments. Psychologists have also
studied how people perceive risks to their (or others') health
and safety and, in particular, how their perceptions and related
decisions may be biased by various factors that expert risk
analysts would consider extraneous to those judgments. In this
Article, I draw on some of this research to explore the roles
that emotions and risk perceptions may play in jurors' decision
making in cases arising out of the September 11, 2001 attacks
on the World Trade Center, should any such cases get that far.
People reacted and continue to react to the 9/11 attacks
with strong and complicated emotions, including horror, fear,
anger, sympathy and sadness. But how might these or other
emotions influence jurors' attributions of responsibility and
blame to, for instance, the Port Authority in a lawsuit alleging
(among other things) negligence in the reinforcement and
fireproofing of the towers,1 or to Saudi princes, banks and
© 2003 Neal R. Feigenson. All Rights Reserved.
Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University School of Law. I am grateful to
Larry Solan, who organized the Brooklyn Law School conference, "Responsibility and
Blame: Psychological and Legal Perspectives," at which I presented an abbreviated
version of this paper; Tony Sebok, the discussant on my panel; the other participants at
the conference; and the editors of the Brooklyn Law Review. I presented earlier
versions of this work at the New York Law School Law and Social Science colloquium
on April 5, 2002 and at my law school's Faculty Forum on October 9, 2002; I would like
to thank those who attended those talks for their helpful comments. I would also like to
thank Dave DeSteno and Jennifer Lerner for discussing their research with me.
Mulligan v. Port Authority, No. 02 Civ. 6885 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2002);
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charitable organizations in a case alleging (among other things)
that these defendants financially aided and abetted the
terrorists who committed the attacks?2
In the first portion of this Article, I survey the empirical
research on the effects of people's moods and emotions on their
judgments of legal responsibility and blame. This complex body
of research indicates that jurors' emotions may influence their
legal judgments in two kinds of ways: by affecting how
carefully jurors process trial information, and by inclining
jurors toward particular attributions of responsibility or blame.
This Section concludes with a discussion of the processes by
which emotions influence attributions of responsibility and
blame. In the second Section, I summarize more briefly some of
the research on lay risk perceptions, the intersections between
people's risk perceptions and their emotions and how both may
affect decisions regarding legal responsibility.
In the third Section of this Article, I apply these
cognitive and social psychological findings to 9/11 cases against
the Port Authority and the Saudis, respectively. The research
suggests that while the overall effect of jurors' emotions and
risk perceptions on their judgments in 9/11 cases may very well
be increased blaming of defendants, those effects may be quite
nuanced and complicated. Jurors' sympathy for the victims of
9/11 is predicted to incline them to blame the defendants more
than they otherwise would, because they will be more inclined
to compensate the victims, and the only way they can do this is
to hold the defendants liable. Jurors' anger may increase
blaming through several processes: their increased reliance on
heuristic cues (e.g., stereotype-based appeals); their increased
tendency to interpret ambiguous behavior as blameworthy; and
their use of anger itself as a signal that the defendants deserve
David W. Chen, Suits by 950 Families Allege Safety Lapses at the Towers, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 14, 2002, at B3. In an order dated September 6, 2002, Judge Hellerstein ruled
that the plaintiffs, by suing the Port Authority but otherwise allowing the suit to
remain "dormant" as defined therein, did not abandon their right to file a claim for
compensation under the September l1th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-42, §§ 401-409, 115 Stat. 230, 237 (2001) (codified in 49 U.S.C.); by filing such
a claim, however, a plaintiff would be barred from proceeding with a suit against the
Port Authority. Section 201 of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L.
No. 107-71 §§ 110-15, 115 Stat. 597, 646 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.), limits the liability of the Port Authority (and any other "person with a property
interest in the World Trade Center, on September 11, 2001") to its liability insurance
coverage, which is $650 million. See also James V. Grimaldi, After a Respectful Pause,
Lawyers Line Up to Sue, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2002, at El.
2 Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., No. 1:02CV01616 (D.D.C. Nov. 22,
2002).
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blame and punishment. Moreover, fear provoked by the attacks
may lead to blaming through at least two distinct processes.
Under one process, fear increases the perceived risks of
terrorism, which, in combination with the hindsight bias, may
lead jurors to hold defendants liable for not having done more
to avoid that risk. And to manage the terror that contemplation
of their own deaths would otherwise provoke, jurors are likelier
to respond punitively to defendants whom they perceive to
have challenged their shared cultural norms and symbols.
The complexity of emotional responses and contextual
features of juror decision making, however, suggests that the
effects of emotions on blaming in these cases are likely to be
moderated by several case-specific factors, including the
identity of the defendant(s); the legal theory of recovery; the
strength of the parties' respective arguments; and the
emotional tonality encouraged by lawyers' case presentations.
In particular, while jurors' sympathy may play a role in both
the case against the Port Authority and the case against the
Saudis, their anger and fear are more likely to increase
blaming of the Saudis. I also briefly discuss the extent to which
jurors may be expected to adjust their judgments appropriately
to correct for any emotional influences they perceive to be
undesirable.
In a relatively brief Article, I can only skim the surface
of the immensely complicated subject of the effects of emotions
and risk perceptions on each other and on social judgments.
Speculations about likely effects are especially problematic
where, as here, the underlying research is inconclusive, the
emotions are so complex and conflicting and many situational
variables could affect both emotional responses and ultimate
judgments. And, of course, what happens in a single case
cannot confirm or disconfirm inferences derived from research
that yields probabilistic findings. Nevertheless, theory and
research on the emotions and risk perception may help us to
understand better not only 9/11 litigation but also legal
decision making in less exceptional cases.
20031
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
I. THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS AND MOODS IN ATTRIBUTIONS
OF RESPONSIBILITY AND BLAME
It will help to start with a very brief introduction to
emotion theory.3 While any capsule description is bound to be
problematic, "emotion" may be defined as:
a complex set of interactions . .. mediated by neural/hormonal
systems, which can (a) give rise to affective experiences such as
feelings of arousal, pleasure/displeasure; (b) generate cognitive
processes such as emotionally relevant perceptual effects [and]
appraisals ... ; (c) activate widespread physiological adjustments to
the arousing conditions; and (d) lead to behavior that is often, but
not always, expressive, goal-directed, and adaptive.4
That is, emotions combine affect,5 cognition and action (or
inclinations to act, whether or not realized).
The primary function of emotions is to signal changes in
the environment that are important to the person experiencing
the emotion, and to help that person choose among and
coordinate competing goals and values.6 While some of this
processing occurs pre- and subconsciously, the signaling
function is inescapably cognitive. The cognitive theory of
emotions,7 which just about all research on emotions and social
judgment takes to be valid, explains that each emotion depends
on an (implicit) appraisal of the significance for the person of
changes in that person's environment. And emotions, or groups
of them, can be differentiated based on the general cognitive
structures of these appraisals. These cognitive structures are
also known as their "appraisal structures" or "core relational
themes."8 For instance, the cognitive structure of anger is
"disapproving of someone else's blameworthy action and being
displeased about the related event;"9 its core relational theme is
3 For a brief overview of the psychology of the emotions, from which the
following material in the text is adapted, see NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: How
JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS 69-86, 235-41 (2000).
4 ROBERT PLUTCHIK, THE PSYCHOLOGY AND BIOLOGY OF EMOTION 5 (1994).
6 Within the general category of affect, "moods, which tend to be less
intense, more diffuse, and relatively enduring, and to lack a readily identifiable source,
may be distinguished from emotions, which tend to be more intense and short-lived,
and to have an identifiable cause." FEIGENSON, supra note 3, at 235.
' See ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR 165-201 (1994).
7 See, e.g., ANDREW ORTONY ET AL., THE COGNITIVE STRUCTURE OF
EMOTIONS (1988).
8 Richard Lazarus, Universal Antecedents of the Emotions, in THE NATURE
OF EMOTION (Paul Ekman & Richard J. Davidson eds., 1994).
9ORTONY ET AL., supra note 7, at 148.
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to have perceived "a demeaning offense against me and mine. ""
The core relational theme of sympathy is to "be moved by
another's [undeserved] suffering and want to help."11
Emotions and moods can influence social judgments in
at least two kinds of ways. They can affect the depth of
information processing: how carefully people think through the
task or message before them. They can also affect how people
make particular kinds of judgments, such as estimating risks
or attributing blame. I discuss these types of effect in turn.
A. The Influence of Emotions and Moods on Information
Processing
Research has uncovered robust effects of emotions and
moods on information processing, including receptivity to
persuasive messages. Many studies, for instance, have shown
"that people in a (moderately) positive mood tend to think more
creatively and to be better at drawing associations and [at]
inductive reasoning than people in a neutral mood, whereas
people in a (moderately) negative mood tend to be ... better at
analytic and deductive reasoning."12 Research supporting the
prominent Elaboration Likelihood Model ("ELM") of attitude
change, for instance, shows that negative moods lead to more
deliberate, bottom-up information processing, more careful
consideration of the content of persuasive messages and less
reliance on peripheral and heuristic cues. 3
10 Lazarus, supra note 8, at 164. In addition, emotional response, expression
and interpretation are also shaped by culture, see, e.g., EMOTION AND CULTURE
(Shinobu Kitayama & Hazel Rose Markus eds., 1994), even if certain "basic" emotions
and their expressions seem to be experienced and recognized across cultures, see, e.g.,
Paul Ekman, All Emotions are Basic, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION 15 (Paul Ekman &
Richard J. Davidson eds., 1994). I put these complications to the side.
1 Lazarus, supra note 8, at 164. Lazarus does not include "undeserved" in his
expression of sympathy's core relational theme, but extensive research by Bernard
Weiner (see infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text) and others warrants its
inclusion. See Neal Feigenson, Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A Psychological
Analysis, 65 TENN. L. REV. 1, 4-8 (1997) (definitions and conditions of sympathy).
12 FEIGENSON, supra note 3, at 240; Joseph P. Forgas, Affect and Social
Judgments: An Introductory Review, in EMOTION AND SOCIAL JUDGMENTS, 15-16
(Joseph P. Forgas ed., 1991).
13 Richard E. Petty & John T. Cacioppo, The Elaboration Likelihood Model of
Persuasion, in 19 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 123 (Leonard
Berkowitz, ed., 1986). Relatedly, framing a message negatively (to emphasize risks
over benefits) has been shown to induce greater message processing, although this
effect is moderated by the audience's need for cognition and expectations regarding the
message frame; i.e., persons low in need for cognition who were led by the title of the
stimulus article to expect a negatively framed message engaged in less processing of
such a message. Stephen M. Smith & Richard E. Petty, Message Framing and
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
An increasing amount of research traces the influence of
affect on information processing not (only) to the valence of the
affective state-whether the mood or emotion is positive or
negative-but to particular qualities of the specific emotion
experienced. For instance, some studies have found that
although anger and sadness are both negatively valenced
emotions, only anger leads to less systematic information
processing (i.e., greater reliance on heuristics).4 This effect is
due to what scholars have labeled the "appraisal tendencies" of
the respective emotions. Specifically, some emotions such as
anger, disgust and happiness are typically associated with a
greater sense of certainty; other emotions, such as hope,
anxiety and some forms of sadness, are typically associated
with uncertainty. The more certain people feel, the less
inclined they are to process information systematically,
because they are more confident that they already know what
they need to know to address the task at hand. Accordingly
Larissa Tiedens and Susan Linton found that the higher degree
of certainty associated with anger, as opposed to sadness (or
fear), leads to greater susceptibility to heuristic cues." In one
experiment, for instance, participants were asked to indicate
how much they agreed with an essay on grading policies. In one
condition, the essay was presented as a published work and
attributed to an education professor (expert); in the other, it
was presented in typewritten format, authored by a student
(non-expert). Participants who had been induced to feel angry
(or another emotion associated with certainty) were influenced
by the expertise cues (they registered greater agreement with
the "expert" essay); those induced to feel worry were unaffected
by these cues. Tiedens and Linton also found that angry
Persuasion: A Message Processing Analysis, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
257 (1996).
Among the explanations offered for the general effect of mood on level of
information processing, it has been argued that people generally want to avoid
negative moods-such moods signal that things are not right in the world-so people in
negative moods are motivated to repair those moods, which may require systematic,
careful thinking. Positive moods, by contrast, signal that the world is safe, so that
there's less need to expend scarce cognitive resources. See Forgas, supra note 12.
14 Sadness, by contrast, leads to more careful information processing. See
Carolyn Semmler & Neil Brewer, Effects of Mood and Emotion on Juror Processing and
Judgments, 20 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 423 (2002) (reporting that mock jurors whom
simulated case facts made sad were better able to identify testimonial inconsistencies
than mock jurors whose mood remained neutral).
15 Larissa Z. Tiedens & Susan Linton, Judgment Under Emotional Certainty
and Uncertainty: The Effects of Specific Emotions on Information Processing, 81 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 973, 974 (2001).
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participants were less able to distinguish substantively
stronger from weaker arguments. Other researchers have
similarly found that anger leads people to consider fewer
factors when making judgments 6 and makes them more likely
to be influenced by stereotypes in making related social
judgments. 7
B. The Influence of Emotions and Moods on the Attribution
of Responsibility and Blame
Psychologists have also identified relationships between
emotions and particular judgmental tasks, such as attributing
responsibility and blame, as well as the actions or inclinations
to act (such as punishing or awarding compensation) associated
with those attributions. This research provides varying degrees
of evidence for at least four sorts of judgmental paths involving
jurors' emotional responses:
* Path one: from construal of target features to
attributions of responsibility to emotional
response (and associated actions or inclinations
to act);
* Path two: from construal of target features to
emotional response to attributions of
responsibility (and associated actions or
inclinations to act);
* Path three: from emotional state to construal of
target features to attributions of responsibility
(and associated actions or inclinations to act);
* Path four: from emotional state to attributions of
responsibility (and associated actions or
inclinations to act).
Differentiating these paths is useful for reviewing the relevant
literature and summing up the present state of psychological
16 Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Sober Second Thought: The Effects of
Accountability, Anger, and Authoritarianism on Attributions of Responsibility, 24
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 563 (1998).
17 Galen V. Bodenhausen, Emotions, Arousal, and Stereotypic Judgments: A
Heuristic Model of Affect and Stereotyping, in AFFECT, COGNITION, AND STEREOTYPING
13 (Diane M. Mackie & David L. Hamilton eds., 1993); Galen V. Bodenhausen et al.,
Negative Affect and Social Judgment: The Differential Impact of Anger and Sadness, 24
EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 45 (1994). Bodenhausen also reports a study showing that
anxiety, like anger, leads to increased stereotypic processing. Most of the studies of the
effects of specific emotions on information processing, however, distinguish anger (and
happiness) from sadness (or neutral conditions). See Bodenhausen, supra.
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knowledge on this topic. Most importantly, differences between
the paths may affect how emotions relevant to potential 9/11
cases are likely to figure in jurors' decision making. 8
In path one, relevant features of a case can affect
attributions of responsibility and blame, which in turn affect
emotional responses and associated action tendencies. The
research design takes some stimulus of interest-say, how
blameworthy the victim is-as the independent variable, and
measures emotional response and inclination to act on it as the
dependent variable. For instance, in a series of studies
spanning a generation, Bernard Weiner and his associates
have found that emotional responses to suffering depend on
attributions of responsibility. 9 When an observer perceives a
person in need of aid (including a victim of accident, disease or
natural disaster), the observer attempts to discern the cause of
the need. If the cause is perceived to be outside the sufferer's
control," the observer reacts with sympathy and is inclined to
help. If the cause is perceived to be within the sufferer's
control, the observer reacts with anger and is inclined to ignore
the sufferer.2' Thus, emotion figures as an output of the
attribution of responsibility or blame.
1 I do not mean to argue that emotions, even where jurors feel them, entirely
drive their legal judgments, or that those judgments may not also be subject to other,
non-emotional cognitive biases (such as availability, representativeness, framing
effects and so on). Further, I do not address in this Article the difficult question of the
extent to which the law (notwithstanding the formal proscription of emotional
influence typically found in jury instructions) does or ought to accommodate or even
welcome jurors' emotions. It can be argued that many aspects of evidence law and trial
procedure acknowledge jurors' emotions and perhaps even enhance their salience, e.g.,
through dramatic concentration. See generally ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE
TRIAL (1999). And whether legal decision making ought to incorporate emotions to an
even greater degree than it does has been the subject of much spirited debate. See, e.g.,
THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan Bandes ed., 1999). (I thank my colleagues Steve Latham,
Greg Loken and Linda Meyer for raising these issues.)
19 Much of the research is collected and synthesized in BERNARD WEINER,
JUDGMENTS OF RESPONSIBILITY: A FOUNDATION FOR A THEORY OF SOCIAL CONDUCT
(1995).
" The dependent variables in the cited research variously include
attributions of control, responsibility and blame; these can be treated as synonymous
for the present purposes. See Feigenson, supra note 11, at 58 n. 247.
21 Other researchers have posited other factors as well, such as the actor's
intent and the absence of adequate justification for the act, as preconditions for a
response of anger. See, e.g., Brian M. Quigley & James T. Tedeschi, Mediating Effects
of Blame Attributions on Feelings of Anger, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
1280, 1280-81 (1996). Quigley and Tedeschi found that attributions of blame mediated
the effect of these variables and of the extent of the harm on participants' anger. They
used a different research design, however, in which participants were asked to
remember an incident in which someone had harmed them, to rate the perceived levels
of harm, blameworthiness and justification, and then to report the amount of blame
[Vol. 68: 4
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In path two, relevant features of a case may provoke
emotional responses, which in turn affect attributions of
responsibility or blame.22 That is, the emotion is an input to,
not an output of, the attribution. This path is established by
research showing that jurors' emotions mediate the effects of
case features, such as the severity of an accident or a party's
blameworthiness, on attributions of responsibility and damage
awards." The case features are the independent variables; the
attributions are the dependent variables; the former affect the
latter because of the effect they have on jurors' emotions.
For instance, Brian Bornstein has found that sympathy
mediates the effect of outcome severity on mock jurors'
responsibility judgments.24 In one set of experiments, a product
liability lawsuit against the manufacturer of a birth control
pill, mock jurors were more sympathetic to the more seriously
injured plaintiff, and this greater sympathy made them more
likely to find the defendant liable. 5 Similarly, Jai Park, Peter
Salovey and I found in comparative negligence cases that anger
mediated the effect of the parties' blameworthiness and the
severity of the outcome on participants' apportionments of fault
(but not their damage awards).26 Increasing the severity of the
accident made participants angrier at the defendant, which led
them to apportion more fault to the defendant. Increasing the
they attributed to the other person in their remembered scenario and the amount of
anger and resentment they felt toward that person (as well as other felt emotions). The
researchers then measured correlations among the various responses. The structural
model they developed to account for their findings, in which blame mediated the effects
of harm, intent and justification on anger and anger mediated the effects of those same
variables on blame, is consistent with path one (and two) but, due to the differences in
experimental design, does not directly support either. See infra note 62.
22 Similarly, moral intuitionism posits that people's intuitive, affective
responses to features of the target drive their moral judgments, with moral reasoning
playing a secondary, post hoc role. See Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and its
Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV.
814 (2001). In this model, affective responses are distinguished only by valence (i.e.,
like-dislike, good-bad), not by specific emotional appraisals.
23 See Reuben M. Baron & David A. Kenny, The Moderator-Mediator Variable
Distinction in Social Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical
Considerations, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1173 (1986) (defining and
explaining "mediation" in social psychological research design).
24 Brian Bornstein, From Compassion to Compensation: The Effect of Injury
Severity on Mock Jurors' Liability Judgments, 28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1477
(1998).
25 Id.
26 Neal Feigenson et al., The Role of Emotions in Comparative Negligence
Judgments, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 576 (2001); see also Quigley & Tedeschi,
supra note 21, at 1284 (noting effects of harm on blame mediated by anger).
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plaintiffs blameworthiness made them angrier at the plaintiff,
which led them to apportion more fault to the plaintiff.
27
Why do emotions figure in people's blaming in these
ways? What functions do emotions serve in these first two
paths-what are emotions doing, for instance, when they
mediate the effect of case features on jurors' attributions of
blame? The most plausible explanation is that in these
situations, people use their current emotional state (affect) as
an informational cue regarding the judgment target. For
example, because the cognitive or appraisal structure of anger
is "disapproving of someone else's blameworthy action and
being displeased about the related event," 8 being angry sends a
signal" to the person that the target of judgment has behaved
in a blameworthy fashion and, therefore, deserves to be blamed
(path two). Similarly, because the cognitive structure of
sympathy includes an awareness that another is suffering
undeservedly and a desire to help, ° feeling sympathy for a
target thus signals that the person is not to blame (path two)
and deserves to be helped (path one).
These paths involve what may be labeled intrinsic
emotion sources: Features of the judgment target itself provoke
decision-relevant affective responses. Extrinsic emotions, ones
provoked by stimuli incidental or extraneous to the judgment
task, have also been shown to affect attributions of
responsibility and blame, as well as other kinds of judgments. 1
27 Outcome severity is, of course, legally relevant to the determination of
damages if the defendant is found liable. It may even be legally relevant to the
determination of fault to the extent that the decision maker uses the (type and) extent
of the harm that actually occurred to infer the harm that should have been foreseen,
and hence whether the defendant failed to use reasonable care when it failed to avoid
(or otherwise increased the risk of) that harm. Such reasoning, however, is prone to the
hindsight bias and anchoring effects, among other non-emotional cognitive biases. The
research cited in the text does not dispute these contentions; it simply shows that
outcome severity can affect attributions of fault and liability because it affects the
amount of anger jurors feel toward the responsible party.
28 ORTONY ET AL., supra note 7, at 148.
29 See DAMASIO, supra note 6.
30 See Feigenson, supra note 11, at 4-8 (noting definitions and conditions of
sympathy).
3, See Reid Hastie, Emotions in Jurors' Decisions, 66 BROOK. L. REv. 991
(2001). Hastie classifies as "anticipated emotions" most of what I regard as intrinsic
emotions, arguing that the sympathy, anger and so on that the case itself may
engender are best understood in terms of the decision maker's desire to decide in such
a way as to relieve the emotional disquiet the case produces; thus, anticipated emotions
concern the expected consequences of the decision. Id. at 1004-06. Hastie reserves for
the category of "decision-relevant" emotions the effects on information processing
believed to obtain while the decision maker is deciding. Id. at 1002-04.
[Vol. 68: 4
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Paths three and four start from emotional responses to
extrinsic stimuli.
In path three, extrinsically induced emotion affects the
way people construe the relevant features of the target, which
in turn affects their subsequent judgments. For instance,
research consistently shows that people who are angry tend to
blame more. Jennifer Lerner, Julie Goldberg and Philip Tetlock
found that participants who viewed an anger-provoking video
clip and then read several vignettes of accident cases blamed
the defendants who caused the injuries more than did
participants who had watched an emotion-neutral video.32
Similarly, Dacher Keltner, Phoebe Ellsworth and Kari
Edwards found that angry participants tended to attribute
more responsibility to the person than to the situation
regarding ambiguous social mishaps; sad participants did the
opposite.3 Keltner and his colleagues found that anger and
sadness affected participants' attributions of causal
responsibility, which in turn affected blaming.
The process or mechanism posited to explain this
influence of extrinsic emotion on subsequent judgments of
responsibility is appraisal tendency, the same process offered to
explain the effects of specific emotions on information
processing mentioned above. 4 Experiencing an emotion makes
32 Lerner et al., supra note 16.
33 Dacher Keltner et al., Beyond Simple Pessimism: Effects of Sadness and
Anger on Social Perception, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 740 (1993). The only
other study of specific extrinsic emotion effects on blaming judgments that I have been
able to find is Dennis Gallagher & Gerald Clore, Effects of Fear and Anger on
Judgments of Risk and Evaluations of Blame (unpublished paper presented at
proceedings of Midwestern Psychological Association, May 4, 1985) (discussed infra
note 46).
34 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. Appraisal tendency may
appear to resemble closely what the literature refers to as affect priming, at least in a
loose sense of that phrase which encompasses any exposure preceding the judgment
task to a stimulus with properties congruent, or that the participant may perceive to be
congruent, with properties of the judgment target. See, e.g., Forgas, supra note 12, at
10-13. Thus, in the appraisal tendency research, the appraisal theme or cognitive
structure of the experienced emotion biases subsequent judgments that relate to that
theme or structure, and does so in the directions one would expect. Anger makes people
blame more by priming them to interpret ambiguous features of a scenario consistently
with anger's appraisal theme, in which human agency causes bad outcomes. Anger
makes people less pessimistic about future risks because anger's appraisal tendency
includes a sense of control and certainty, which makes them think that future events
can be known and controlled. This sense of control tends to undermine the perceived
seriousness and frequency of future events, according to the psychometric model of risk
perception. See infra notes 75-83 and accompanying text. In the strict sense, priming
may bypass cognitive appraisals entirely. Robert B. Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking:
Closing the Debate Over the Independence of Affect, in FEELING & THINKING: THE ROLE
OF AFFECT IN SOCIAL COGNITION, 31, 49-50 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2000) [hereinafter
2003]
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features of that emotion's cognitive structure more accessible
and thus more likely to be utilized (consciously or not) in
subsequent perceptions and judgments. 5 Accordingly, angry
people blame more because the cognitive structure of the anger
they experience (e.g., "disapproving of someone else's
blameworthy action and being displeased about the related
undesirable event"36) makes salient the role of other people, as
opposed to situational factors, as causes of harm, which in turn
engenders blame. 7 In this way, emotion influences blaming
judgments indirectly: path three proceeds from extrinsic
emotion to attribution (of causation or fault) and thence to
judgment of blame and inclination to punish.
One especially interesting feature of the appraisal
tendency process is that even when people are aware that the
source of their emotional state has nothing to do with the
judgment target, the emotion continues to affect their
judgments. Anger, for instance, has been shown to persist past
the emotion-provoking episode in the form of a residual arousal
FEELING AND THINKING]. Jennifer Lerner told me that she views appraisal tendencies
"as a kind of affect priming [that] go beyond the general 'priming' label by specifying
the mechanisms" by which the effects on judgments occur (personal communication,
September 24, 2002). Another way of thinking about this is that appraisal tendency
refers to the "functional ends" of appraisal, while priming, as generally understood,
does not require this functionalist orientation. Jennifer S. Lerner & Dacher Keltner,
Fear, Anger, and Risk, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 146, 147 (2001).
35 This is true whether the emotion induction itself involved appraisals of
causal responsibility (e.g., stories meant to provoke anger or sadness) or was purely
physical (e.g., adoption of facial expressions and postures indicated by anger and
sadness) and thus largely non-cognitive, proving that it was the experience of the
emotion rather than the cognitive appraisals alone that influenced subsequent
attributions. Keltner et al., supra note 33, at 748-49.
36 ORTONYETAL., supra note 7, at 148.
37 Keltner et al., supra note 33. Arguably, Keltner, Ellsworth and Edwards's
article is the only set of studies that unambiguously shows appraisal tendency effects
on judgments of blame. In Sober Second Thought, Lerner et al. do not clearly state that
appraisal tendency is the process behind their finding that angry participants blamed
and punished more; they even state that their findings "might represent a form of
misattribution," but then carefully explain in a footnote why they do not believe that
affect as information best accounts for their results. Lerner et al., supra note 16, at
570, 573 n.9. It does not seem that the emotion effects in Lerner et al.'s study, by
enhancing the salience of human agency in ambiguous situations, had similar results
to those in Keltner et al., supra note 33, because in all four scenarios, the causal role
and indeed culpability of the human protagonist was quite clear. Lerner et al., supra
note 16, at 572. In their subsequent papers on the effects of emotions on risk
perception, however, Lerner and her colleagues define the appraisal tendency model
more thoroughly and provide empirical evidence. See, e.g., Lerner & Keltner, supra
note 34; Jennifer S. Lerner & Dacher Keltner, Beyond Valence: Toward a Model of
Emotion-Specific Influences on Judgment and Choice, 14 COGNITION & EMOTION 473
(2000) [hereinafter Beyond Valence]. In these papers, they cite Sober Second Thought
as well as Keltner et al.'s 1993 paper as instances of appraisal tendency effects.
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or excitation, which may then influence subsequent, unrelated
decisions." Apparently, people remain at least partly unaware
of the ways in which that emotion has primed them to construe
the target.3 9
In path four, as in paths one and two, people take their
experience of an emotion as directly informative about the
target of their judgment.4" Indeed, the literature describes path
four as the affect-as-information model." The difference
between this path and paths one and two is that here, the real
source of the emotion is extrinsic. But how can extrinsic
emotion, which by definition is not provoked by the judgment
target, possibly be regarded as directly informative of the
judgment target? It can when people misattribute their
emotional response to the target instead of its true source. For
instance, in a classic study, people asked on rainy days to
gauge their life satisfaction gave more negative responses than
did people asked on sunny days.42 When the attention of the
former group of respondents had been called to the weather,
however, the difference disappeared.43 That is, people took their
current mood (negative or positive) as informative about the
judgment target ("How satisfied am I with my life?"). In effect,
they misattributed the experienced emotion, which was
provoked by something not relevant to the target of judgment,
to the target. When the misattribution was corrected by
38 See Dolf Zillmann, Transfer of Excitation in Emotional Behavior, in SOCIAL
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 215 (John Cacioppo & Richard E. Petty eds., 1983).
39 Lerner et al., supra note 16, at 570; see also Zajonc, supra note 34, at 51-52
(finding that affective priming influenced liking even when participants were told
about possible extrinsic source effects).
40 Thus, while path four resembles path three in that the source of the
emotion is extrinsic, it differs from path three in that the effect on social judgment is
direct rather than indirect.
41 Gerald L. Clore et al., Affective Causes and Consequences of Social
Information Processing, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION 323 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr.
& Thomas K Srull eds., 2d ed. 1994); Norbert Schwarz, Feelings as Information:
Judgments and Processing Strategies, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 534 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter Feelings as
Information]; Norbert Schwarz, Feelings as Information: Informational and
Motivational Functions of Affective States, in 2 HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION AND
COGNITION 527 (E. Tory Higgins & R. Sorrentino eds., 1990); Norbert Schwarz &
Gerald L. Clore, How Do I Feel About It? The Informative Function of Affective States,
in AFFECT, COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 44 (Klaus Fiedler & Joseph Forgas eds.,
1988); Norbert Schwarz & Gerald L. Clore, Mood, Misattribution, and Judgments of
Well-Being: Informative and Directive Functions of Affective States, 45 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 513 (1983) [hereinafter Mood and Misattribution].
42 Schwarz & Clore, Mood and Misattribution, supra note 41, at 519.
" Id. at 520.
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identifying the true source of their emotion, the effect
disappeared.'
Extrinsic emotion effects on many sorts of decisions,
from judgments of life satisfaction to risk perceptions, 45 have
been explained in terms of the affect-as-information
mechanism. This process has also been invoked to explain
extrinsic emotion effects on judgments of blame, 4 although, to
the best of my knowledge, no studies directly test the process
using such judgments as the dependent variable.
Another type of emotion influence on blaming and other
social judgments that is highly relevant to the inquiry into 9/11
cases and can be prompted by either intrinsic or extrinsic
stimuli is described by terror management theory. According to
this line of research, people's awareness of their own mortality
and what would otherwise be their consequent terror at the
prospect of personal annihilation engenders two levels of
defensive reactions: conscious efforts to suppress thoughts of
death or to rationalize death-risking conduct, and subconscious
efforts to defend the cultural worldview that is one's bulwark
against impermanence and meaninglessness." The terror or
fear that drives this latter defensive process is not consciously
experienced (at least, not if the defenses are working), so it is
not the emotion, but rather emotion-relevant thoughts, that
mediate the effects of mortality salience on consequent
44 Id.
45 David DeSteno et al., Beyond Valence in the Perception of Likelihood: The
Role of Emotion Specificity, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 397 (2000).
46 Gallagher & Clore, supra note 33. This brief, unpublished research report
does not clearly distinguish between the affect-as-information and appraisal tendency
processes. The authors write that "[t]he idea guiding the present work is the notion
that people use their momentary feelings as information for making judgments," which
is the main idea of affect-as-information. Id. (manuscript at 2). They also conclude that
"[t]he effects observed in this study are consistent with the notion that feeling states
provide the experiencing person with information with which to make judgments." Id.
(manuscript at 8). Their finding that anger influenced an anger-related judgment (by
leading participants to blame more) and not a fear-related judgment, however, is
consistent with affect priming as well. Norbert Schwarz, one of the leading proponents
of the affect-as-information account, also explains the findings of Keltner, Ellsworth
and Edwards in Beyond Simple Pessimism: Effects of Sadness and Anger on Social
Perception in these terms, although, as noted above, Keltner et al.'s studies seem to
provide the least ambiguous support for the appraisal tendency model. Schwarz,
Feelings as Information, supra note 41, at 541, 544 (explaining Keltner et al., supra
note 33).
Jeff Greenberg et al., Terror Management Theory of Self-Esteem and
Cultural Worldviews: Empirical Assessments and Conceptual Refinements, in 29
ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 61 (1997); Tom Pyszczynski et al., A Dual-
Process Model of Defense Against Conscious and Unconscious Death-Related Thoughts:
An Extension of Terror Management Theory, 106 PSYCHOL. REV. 835 (1999).
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judgments.48 Nevertheless, terror regarding the threat of
personal annihilation is the motivating force for this process.
When people's mortality is made salient, they punish
more severely those who transgress cultural norms.49 They also
feel greater attachment to shared cultural symbols. For
instance, participants in one experiment were asked to sift
sand from dye and were given either a white cloth or an
American flag to do the job; everyone did it, but those who had
been induced to think about their death took longer to use the
flag and expressed greater reluctance about doing so."° They
indulge in more racial/cultural stereotyping.5' And they
attribute more blame to members of outgroups. In another
experiment, participants were shown a video of an auto
accident said to be the result of a defect in either an American
or Japanese car. Those who had been induced to think about
their mortality blamed the Japanese car manufacturer more
than did those who had not. 2
At least in theory, jurors' decision making in 9/11 (or
other) cases could reflect the impact of any or all of the
emotions mentioned so far-sympathy, anger, fear-as well as
any or all of the paths of emotional influence described above. 3
41 Pyszczynski et al., supra note 47, at 836-37. Hence, the effect of mortality
salience on subsequent judgments most resembles path two, except that emotion-
relevant thoughts, rather than emotional experience, mediate the effect of the
independent variable (mortality salience) on the dependent variable (e.g., blame or
punishment).
49 Abram Rosenblatt et al., Evidence for Terror Management Theory: I. The
Effects of Mortality Salience on Reactions to Those Who Violate or Uphold Cultural
Values, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 681 (1989).
50 Jeff Greenberg et al., Evidence of a Terror Management Function of
Cultural Icons: The Effects of Mortality Salience on the Inappropriate Use of Cherished
Cultural Symbols, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1221 (1995). The mortality
salience manipulation varies from one experiment to another. In the cited experiment,
researchers asked participants to "please describe briefly the emotions that the thought
of your own death arouses in you" and to "jot down, as specifically as you can, what you
think will happen to you as you physically die and once you are physically dead." Id. at
1223.
51 Greenberg et al., supra note 47, at 82-83.
52 Lori J. Nelson et al., General and Personal Mortality Salience and
Nationalistic Bias, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 884 (1997). Mortality
salience did not affect blaming of the American manufacturer. Id.
63 For instance, research suggests that extrinsic emotion may affect jurors'
decision making through both paths three and four, i.e., through both the appraisal
tendency or priming and affect-as-information processes. According to the most
comprehensive model of the relationships between affect and social cognition, the
Affect Infusion Model ("AIM"), affects priming and affect as information could influence
jurors' decision making, although it is not clear which process would be more
important. See Joseph P. Forgas, Affect and Information Processing Strategies: An
Interactive Relationship, in FEELING AND THINKING: THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN SOCIAL
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It is worth identifying the processes as well as the emotions
because jurors' judgments are likely to depend on the how as
well as the what of affective influence. I sketch a few
possibilities below.
While all emotional responses reflect an appreciation
(even if partly subconscious) of the relevance for the self of
something in the perceiver's environment, some emotions
implicate the ego more than others. Specifically, the anxiety
aroused by the awareness of one's own mortality, which leads
to a variety of defensive coping mechanisms, such as terror
management, is a more highly ego-driven response to the
environment than, say, sympathy (or anger resulting from
other processes). This difference may be important because
highly ego-driven emotional responses may be more durable,
and their effects less amenable to correction or debiasing, than
others.
Among the "cooler," less ego-driven emotional effects, we
need to distinguish intrinsic from extrinsic sources of emotion.
Because intrinsic emotion sources are located in the judgment
target itself-the parties and the facts of the case-lawyers are
likelier to succeed in arousing the corresponding emotions
(should they choose to do so, and perhaps in some instances
even if they do not). The probative value of the potentially
emotion-provoking evidence is less likely to be outweighed by
the danger of undue prejudice than it is when the emotion
source is recognizably dubious or of no legal relevance, as it is
when the source is extrinsic.55 Therefore, simply in the course
of appropriately presenting evidence and making arguments
regarding the severity of the harm the plaintiffs suffered and
the blameworthiness of the defendants' conduct, lawyers are
likely to trigger the emotional effects described by paths one
COGNITION 253 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2000); Joseph P. Forgas, The Role of Emotion in
Social Judgments: An Introductory Review and an Affect Infusion Model (AIM), 24
EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (1994); see also FEIGENSON, supra note 3, at 237-38. This dual
effect (for both priming and affect as information on juror judgments) would also be
consistent with the Elaboration Likelihood Model ("ELM") of persuasion: Appraisal
tendency or priming would be likely to occur under what ELM describes as "high
elaboration" conditions (what Forgas refers to as "substantive" processing), while affect
as information would more likely occur under "low elaboration" conditions (what
Forgas refers to as "heuristic" processing). See Richard E. Petty & Duane T. Wegener,
The Elaboration Likelihood Model: Current Status and Controversies, in DUAL-
PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 41 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds.,
1999).
54 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
51 See FED. R. EVID. 403.
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and two (and, in the case of 9/11, by terror management
theory).56
Extrinsic emotion sources should fare differently to the
extent that they are recognized as extrinsic. When people are
made aware that the source of their emotion is actually
extrinsic to the target, they should regard the emotion as
irrelevant to their judgment task; the emotion should,
therefore, cease to have any directly informational effect.57 The
affect-as-information mechanism from extrinsic emotion to
judgment depends on the misattribution of that emotion to the
target. By definition, this mechanism works only when the true
source of the emotion is unrecognized. Relatedly, jurors are
more likely to follow judicial instructions to disregard
emotional influences that the jurors themselves perceive to be
extrinsic, and therefore irrelevant to their judgment task."
By contrast, even recognized extrinsic emotion may
influence judgment through the appraisal tendency process."
56 Compare the doctrine of "intrajudicial" vs. "extrajudicial" bias as it
pertains to the disqualification or recusal of judges. The federal standard regarding
extrajudicial bias is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (2002): A judge should disqualify
himself whenever he has a "personal bias or prejudice concerning a party .... " With
regard to bias arising from the litigation itself-intrajudicial bias-disqualification is
warranted only when the judge's remarks "reveal such a high degree of favoritism or
antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible." Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S.
540, 555 (1994).
51 See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
58 See Jonathan M. Golding et al., Instructions to Disregard Potentially
Useful Information: The Effects of Pragmatics on Evaluative Judgments and Recall, 29
J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 212 (1990) (finding that jurors follow instructions to disregard
evidence when they believe that the evidence has been excluded for irrelevance, and
not for "technical" reasons that do not undermine its relevance). For research
indicating that people take extrinsically induced emotion into account when they deem
it relevant to their decision task but not otherwise, see Karen Gasper & Gerald L.
Clore, Do You Have to Pay Attention to Your Feelings To Be Influenced by Them?, 26
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 698 (2000). Extrinsic emotion effects on judgment
would also seem to be normatively unjustifiable, see Hastie, supra note 31, at 1002, but
judges' instructions typically advise jurors not to be influenced by any emotions: "Your
verdict must be based absolutely and solely upon the evidence .... You should not be
swayed or influenced by any sympathy or prejudice for or against any of the parties."
Douglass B. Wright & William L. Ankerman, 1 CONNECTICUT JURY INSTRUCTIONS
(CIVIL) § 312, at 510 (1993). See Feigenson, supra note 11, at 13 (discussing law's
exclusion of emotion). Standard instructions do not distinguish between what is labeled
here as extrinsic or intrinsic sources of emotion; if anything, the standard instruction
quoted above focuses on intrinsic sources.
'9 See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text. It can be argued that with
regard to extrinsic specific emotions (as opposed to moods), appraisal tendency is a
more likely mechanism than affect as information, because people are less likely to
misattribute the source of a specific emotion (to the target) than they are a more
diffuse mood. See Klaus Fiedler, Affective Influences on Social Information Processing,
in HANDBOOK OF AFFECT AND SOCIAL COGNITION 163, 174-75 (Joseph P. Forgas ed.,
2001); Lerner et al., supra note 16, at 573 n.9. But cf. supra note 45 and accompanying
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In this process, as discussed earlier, emotion influences
attributions of responsibility by priming people to interpret an
ambiguous situation in accordance with the cognitive structureof the • 60
of the emotion. This suggests that for appraisal tendency
effects to occur, the claim or defense must implicate emotion-
relevant features (e.g., human agency as an element of
blameworthiness), and those features cannot already be so
salient that there is no room for the emotion to make them
significantly more salient.
Yet this is not all. So far I have discussed more or less
linear paths between individual emotions and judgments.
Affective responses, especially to a tragedy like 9/11, are likely
to be more complex than this. Researchers have identified
three kinds of complex relationships among multiple emotions
and attributions of responsibility and blame.
First, the relationship between an emotion and an
associated pattern of blaming or other judgment can form a
feedback loop. For instance, blame arising from the construal of
target-relevant features, or the construal of those features
itself, can generate anger (paths one and two, respectively).
That anger then makes salient the role of other people as
causes of harm, which engenders blame (path three).6 Thus,
anger and attributions of blame comprise a feedback loop, a
reciprocal relationship in which each can increase the other."
text (showing evidence for affect-as-information effects of specific emotions).
60 In Beyond Simple Pessimism: Effects of Sadness and Anger on Social
Perception, which reports the experiments that most clearly articulate path three, the
judgment scenarios were highly ambiguous as to human versus situational agency.
Keltner et al., supra note 33. In Sober Second Thought, at least two of the four
scenarios quite plainly indicated that the defendant was responsible. Lerner et al.,
supra note 16. Effects were still found for extrinsically induced anger, but it is difficult
to interpret these as other than consistent with path three, because the authors did not
separately measure attributions of causation and collapsed their measures of blame,
deservingness of punishment, etc. into a single punitiveness measure. Id. at 567, 572.
61 Keltner et al., supra note 33.
62 See Quigley & Tedeschi, supra'note 21; cf. Larissa Z. Tiedens, The Effect of
Anger on the Hostile Inferences of Aggressive and Nonaggressive People: Specific
Emotions, Cognitive Processing, and Chronic Accessibility, 25 MOTIVATION & EMOTION
233, 248 (2001) (noting that aggressiveness, anger and the drawing of hostile
inferences create a vicious cycle). Additional evidence of a feedback loop is suggested by
a study showing that experimental instructions to adopt the perspective of a target
person, leading to more sympathy for that person, leads participants to attribute to the
target more of the participants' own positive traits. See Mark H. Davis et al., Effect of
Perspective Taking on the Cognitive Representation of Persons: A Merging of Self and
Other, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 713 (1996). If sympathy, which includes
perspective taking, is elicited by case-relevant features (paths one and two), that
sympathy might then affect jurors' subsequent interpretations of the facts of the case,
further biasing the judgments they derive from those interpretations. See Feigenson,
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Second, the effects of one emotion can be overcome by
the effects of another. For instance, in a study of judgments in
comparative negligence cases, Jai Park, Peter Salovey and I
found that mock jurors' sympathy for an accident victim was
partly overcome by their anger toward the victim." What
alerted us to this possibility was the finding that participants'
decisions were biased against victims: The more serious the
accident, the more participants blamed the victim, not the
defendant. Participants did feel sympathy for the victims (as
Weiner's research would predict64), and they felt more
sympathy the more seriously the victim was injured (as
Bornstein found65). Yet, they also grew angrier at the victim
and were less able to imagine themselves in the victim's place,
the more blameworthy the victim was. This anger and lack of
empathy are hallmarks of defensive attribution, an intuitive
habit of thought in which observers, by blaming an accident
victim, distance themselves from the victim and preserve their
belief that they will not find themselves in the same position.
Defensive attribution is a way of coping with fear.66 Thus,
anger, driven by fear, can at least partly trump sympathy for
an accident victim.
Third, different emotional responses can also
complement one another. In another study of comparative
negligence judgments,67 participants seem subconsciously to
have taken into account their emotional responses to each
party in deciding how they felt about the other party.
Correlational analyses indicated that the angrier participants
got at the defendant, the more sympathy and sadness they felt
supra note 11, at 11-12, 63-64.
The notion of the feedback loop suggests that appraisal tendency effects
may not be limited to extrinsic emotion. Although, to the best of my knowledge, there is
as yet no research that directly shows appraisal tendency effects using intrinsic
emotion sources, Quigley and Tedeschi used what is best described as an intrinsic
stimulus to obtain significant paths from blame to anger and also from anger to blame.
Quigley and Tedeschi cited, among other sources, Keltner et al., as consistent with
their findings. Quigley & Tedeschi, supra note 21; Keltner et al., supra note 33.
Neal Feigenson et al., Effect of Blameworthiness and Outcome Severity on
Attributions of Responsibility and Damage Awards in Comparative Negligence Cases,
21 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 597 (1997).
'A See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
That is, the more seriously injured the accident victim, the more anxious
our mock jurors became about the prospect of suffering such a terrible fate themselves,
and the more inclined they were to respond defensively to that fear.
67 Feigenson et al., supra note 26, at 592.
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for the plaintiff; the angrier they felt toward the plaintiff, the
greater their sympathy for the defendant."
In sum, the important connections between emotions
and blaming judgments that may be especially germane to jury
decision making in 9/11 cases are as follows: Sadness leads to
more careful, systematic information processing; anger leads to
less careful thinking and more reliance on stereotyping and
other heuristic cues. Sympathy for victims and anger (whether
extrinsic or aroused by the defendant) both lead to greater
blaming of defendants, although anger directed at the victim
(through defensive attribution) can trump sympathy and thus
(through complementarity) decrease blame for the defendant.
And just as anger may increase blame, greater blaming in turn
may lead to more anger, creating a feedback loop. Finally, the
subconscious effort to suppress the fear or anxiety created by
mortality salience leads to greater stereotyping of outgroup
members and more punishment for those perceived to have
violated shared cultural norms or symbols.
II. RISK PERCEPTIONS, EMOTIONS AND RELATED
JUDGMENTS
Let me move on to the topic of people's risk perceptions
and their susceptibility to emotional and other kinds of bias.
First, I introduce one of the leading theories that seek to
explain lay risk perception, the psychometric theory. Then I
discuss some recent findings on how emotions may bias risk
perceptions. Finally, I briefly mention how media coverage of a
risk may also bias risk perceptions and related judgments.
A robust finding in the risk perception literature is that
popular estimates of the likelihood and seriousness of various
risks, as indicated in survey responses and associated
behaviors, often diverge from expert estimates of the objective
probability and severity of those risks. For instance, people
(based on data from about twenty years ago) tended vastly to
overrate the riskiness of nuclear power plants and underrate
the riskiness of smoking and motor vehicle accidents, relative
to the respective risks as experts perceived them.
68 FEIGENSON, supra note 3, at 104. This suggests that participants were
attempting to balance emotional accounts between the parties (and not just legal
accounts, as the law of comparative negligence required by instructing that the
assigned percentages of fault sum to 100%). This and other evidence suggests that
jurors try to conceive of their decision as a satisfying whole, emotionally as well as
cognitively. See id.
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Why? Various theories have been proposed to account
for this and other patterns in popular risk perception. One
leading theory is the psychometric paradigm,69 which posits
that ordinary people perceive risks to be more serious the more
dreaded and the more unknown the risks are.
A risk is dreaded to the extent it is perceived to be
uncontrollable, involuntary and potentially catastrophic in its
consequences. A risk is unknown to the extent it is new, not
observable and not understood. Thus, people dread a nuclear
reactor accident because they think that there is nothing they
can do about it and the consequences would be catastrophic; it
is unknown because nuclear radiation cannot be seen, its
workings are obscure to laypeople and it is thought to be
"unnatural." Hence, people (in the early 1980s) perceived it to
be among the most serious risks. Motor vehicle accidents, by
contrast, are much less dreaded because people think they can
control their vulnerability ("It won't happen to me because I
drive more safely than most people"); such accidents are also
not unknown because they are a familiar, easily visualized
risk. People tended to take them much less seriously.7" The
point of the psychometric model is not that popular risk
perceptions usually diverge from those of experts-often they do
not-or that they are "wrong" when they do,7" but simply that
factors other than objective data tend to guide popular risk
perceptions.
One relevant research finding consistent with the
psychometric paradigm is that the more people dread a risk,
the more people believe that steps should be taken to regulate
or eliminate it. For instance, dread of cancer led to the Delaney
Clause, which requires the FDA to ban any carcinogenic
substance added to food, regardless of the cost of avoiding the
risk or the benefits of declining to avoid it.72
69 Paul Slovic et al., Behavioral Decision Theory Perspectives on Protective
Behavior, in TAKING CARE: UNDERSTANDING AND ENCOURAGING SELF-PROTECTIVE
BEHAVIOR 14 (Neil D. Weinstein ed., 1987) [hereinafter Behavioral Decision Theory];
Paul Slovic et al., Characterizing Perceived Risk, in PERILOUS PROGRESS: TECHNOLOGY
AS HAZARD 91 (R.W. Kates et al. eds., 1985); Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears:
Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES 463 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
70 See Slovic et al., Behavioral Decision Theory, supra note 69, at 28-35.
71 See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, Heuristics and Biases in Application, in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 41, at
730.
72 The Delaney Clause, 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1994). HOWARD MARGOLIS,
DEALING WITH RISK 171, 174-75 (1996). Margolis offers a "risk matrix" approach to
2003]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
People's moods and emotions can influence their risk
perceptions. A classic study by Eric Johnson and Amos Tversky
showed that negative mood, consisting of sadness and anxiety,
induced by reading a story about a person's death tended to
increase the perceived likelihood of all kinds of health and
safety risks, whether or not related to the subject matter of the
story.73 Thus, negative affect had a generalized effect on risk
perception.74
More recent research on the role of affect in risk
perceptions, like that on affect and judgments of responsibility
and blame, has pursued the influences of specific emotions
rather than more generalized moods. Jennifer Lerner and
Dacher Keltner have found that fearful people are more likely
to think that bad things will happen to them; i.e., they make
pessimistic risk estimates. 7' Angry people are more optimistic,
and less likely to believe that bad things will happen to them."
Lerner and Keltner argue that angry people make more
optimistic risk estimates than sad people because the appraisal
tendency of anger is associated with greater certainty and
control, which tends to reduce or negate those qualities of risks
that (according to the psychometric approach) make people
concerned about them-the extent to which those risks are
dreaded and unknown. Thus, emotion affects risk perception
because the cognitive structures or appraisal tendencies of the
respective emotions (anger, fear) either do or do not respond to
the cognitive components of perceived risk, as explained by the
psychometric approach.77 Moreover, these emotion effects are
account for divergences between lay and expert risk perceptions; his approach differs in
some respects from the psychometric model, but resembles it in that he thinks that lay
risk perceptions and lay judgments regarding the advisability of risk-avoidance
measures are based on people's "visceral" sense of the seriousness of risks, rather than
the kind of cost-benefit analysis based on objective data that a professional risk analyst
would favor. See generally id.
73 Eric Johnson & Amos Tversky, Affect, Generalization, and the Perception of
Risk, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 20 (1983).
74 Id.
75 Lerner & Keltner, supra note 34; Lerner & Keltner, Beyond Valence, supra
note 37.
. Lerner & Keltner, supra note 34; Lerner & Keltner, Beyond Valence, supra
note 37.
77 Cf. DeSteno et al., supra note 45 (finding emotional congruence in risk
perceptions: Angry people believe that angering events are more likely to occur than
sad ones; sad people believe the opposite). DeSteno et al.'s findings, which they explain
in terms of the affect-as-information process, are not directly in conflict with those of
Lerner and Keltner, due in part to the different dependent measures used in the
respective studies. A direct test of the two approaches to emotion effects on risk
perception could be conducted, e.g., by measuring the effects of anger on items high on
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most pronounced when the certainty and controllability of the
future event are ambiguous; clearly controllable or
uncontrollable events do not display the same pattern.8
Most recently and most directly on point, Lerner and
other colleagues have found, in a study conducted since 9/11,
that asking people to reflect on the fearful aspects of the 9/11
attacks increased their subsequent estimates of the risk of
terrorism as well as other, unrelated negative events (e.g.,
getting the flu or being victimized by violence other than
another terrorist attack), while asking them to reflect on the
anger-provoking aspects of the attacks reduced those
• 71
estimates. People's emotional reactions to 9/11 displayed
several other interesting features as well.8 ° First, their post-
9/11 risk estimates were wildly inflated relative to any
plausible objective measure. For instance, respondents rated
the likelihood that they themselves would be hurt in a terrorist
attack in the year following 9/11 at 20.5% (and the likelihood
that the "average American" would be hurt at 47.8%).81 Second,
as these and other figures exemplify, people also believed that
bad things are much more likely to happen to others than to
themselves-the "optimism bias." 2 Finally, people's emotional
responses to 9/11 also affected their policy judgments. Those
whose anger at 9/11 was induced more strongly supported more
the psychometric dread and unknown scales: If anger increased people's perceptions of
those risks, the affect-as-information approach would be supported; if it decreased
people's perceptions of those risks, the appraisal tendency approach would be
supported. (I thank both Dave DeSteno and Jennifer Lerner for taking the time to
explain their research to me; the interpretations of their work in this paper-and any
errors in the representation or construal of their findings-are mine alone.)
78 Lerner & Keltner, supra note 34, at 151-52. In unambiguous situations,
emotional valence alone predicted risk estimates: Angry and fearful people were more
optimistic, happy people less.
'9 Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Effects of Fear and Anger on Perceived Risks of
Terrorism, PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE (forthcoming). Lerner et al. also found that
women were much more pessimistic than men, but that differences in self-reported
emotion (women reported being sadder, men angrier, in response to 9/11) explain most
of this gender variance. Incidentally, this research also shows that Lerner's previous
research on the effects of emotion on risk perception generalizes from the perceived
likelihood of self-relevant outcomes ("will it happen to me?") to other-relevant outcomes
as well. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
"' Lerner et al., supra note 79. These observations are based on mean risk
estimates, collapsed across emotion condition.
81 Id. (manuscript at 12-13, 25-26).
' Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 (1980). For instance, respondents estimated their
likelihood of being the victim of a non-terrorist violent crime at 22%, but the likelihood
that the average American would be so victimized at 43%. Lerner et al., supra note 79
(manuscript at 26).
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punitive policies (deporting foreigners without valid visas) and
less strongly supported more conciliatory policies (building ties
with Moslem countries) than did those who were prompted to
feel sad about 9/11.83
One additional influence on lay risk perceptions is
worth mentioning in the current context: media effects. Media
coverage of a risk can influence perceptions and related
judgments regarding that risk by making particular
information about that risk more available to audiences of that
coverage,84 and/or by framing the risk as something worth or
not worth avoiding.85 For instance, Dan Bailis and I found that
print media coverage of air bag risks that overemphasized, in
comparison with objective data, the dangers of air bag
deployment (persons, especially children, killed or injured by
air bags going off in low-speed collisions) relative to air bag
benefits (saving people from death or serious injury in high-
speed collisions) led readers to overestimate the magnitude of
air bag risks and to adopt less favorable views toward air
bags."
In sum, people judge risks to be more serious, and fear
them more, the more the risks are dreaded and unknown. The
more a risk is dreaded, the more people believe that something
should be done to regulate or eliminate it. Furthermore,
people's emotional states influence their risk perceptions: The
most consistent finding is that fearful people tend to be more
pessimistic, and angry people less pessimistic. Finally, media
coverage helps shape the frame in which people make risk-
related judgments. These findings regarding people's emotions,
risk perceptions and judgments of responsibility may help us to
understand the possible decision-making processes of jurors in
two types of cases that have arisen from the 9/11 attacks on the
World Trade Center.
83 Lerner et al., supra note 79 (manuscript at 13, 27-28).
Slovic et al., Behavioral Decision Theory, supra note 69, at 19-21.
85 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39
AMER. PSYCHOLOGIST 341 (1984).
86 Neal R. Feigenson & Daniel S. Bailis, Air Bag Safety: Media Coverage,
Popular Conceptions, and Public Policy, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 444 (2001).
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III. THE ROLE OF EMOTION AND RISK PERCEPTION IN
ATTRIBUTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY AND BLAME IN 9/11
CASES
Roughly 1,000 plaintiffs have filed dozens of suits
against the Port Authority alleging various acts of negligence
in connection with 9/11, including the arrangement of and
building materials used in the stairwells, the condition of the
fire prevention materials and equipment (including non-
compliance with fire safety rules) and the evacuation
procedures (especially the announcement encouraging South
Tower employees to remain at or return to their offices).87 As in
any negligence case, these plaintiffs must prove not only that
the defendant was careless, but also that its carelessness was
the legal (or proximate) cause of their injuries. While it is
difficult to predict confidently until more information is
gathered, even if the plaintiffs can show that the Port
Authority breached its duty of care by carelessness in design,
construction, procedures and the like, proving legal cause will
be a daunting challenge. Causation requires persuading the
judge and jury that the attacks were sufficiently foreseeable to
charge the Port Authority with responsibility for not doing
more to avoid the consequences, and that the intervening
malicious behavior of the terrorists was not a superseding
cause of the tragedy, relieving the Port Authority of
responsibility."8
In another case, about 600 families of victims have filed
an action against the government of Sudan, three members of
the Saudi royal family and several Saudi banks and charities,
seeking over $100 trillion in damages. 9 In addition to various
statutory causes of action and other common law counts, the
complaint includes counts for wrongful death, conspiracy and
aiding and abetting, all of which charge the defendants with
knowingly or deliberately "engaging in, sponsoring, financing,
aiding and abetting and/or otherwise conspiring to commit acts
of terror including the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001."' ° To simplify, I focus on the Saudi defendants and the
87 Chen, supra note 1.
88 See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
263-64, 301-11 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 430-49 (1979).
"9 Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., No. 1:02CV01616 (D.D.C. Nov. 22,
2002).
9 Plaintiffs' Complaint at 244, Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp.
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charge of aiding and abetting only. Again, as relevant
information is only beginning to emerge,9 any forecasts about
eventual trial outcomes remain highly speculative, but the
plaintiffs likely will face, among other difficulties, the challenge
of linking the defendants specifically to the 9/11 attacks, as
required by applicable tort doctrine. 9
A. Emotion and Attributions of Responsibility and Blame
in 9/11 Cases
While jurors' emotional responses to these cases are
likely to be both complex and individually variable, some
general characteristics appear probable. First, jurors'
emotional reactions to 9/11 are likely to be strong even years
after the tragedy. Many of their initial reactions may be
somewhat attenuated or changed by the passage of time, but
they are also likely to be revived by repeated media exposure,
especially extensive coverage around anniversaries of the
attacks, as well as by exposure to accounts of the attacks in the
courtroom itself.93 Second, although jurors may experience at
trial all of the emotions they initially felt-horror, fear,
sympathy, anger and sadness-some emotions may dominate
others. For instance, research indicates that in the immediate
aftermath of the attacks, anger was a more prevalent response
than fear.94 Third, media coverage of 9/11 not only continues to
stimulate emotional responses but also tends to model
(D.D.C. Nov. 22, 2002) (No. 1:02CV01616).
9' See, e.g., Tim Golden & Judith Miller, Al Qaeda Money Trail Runs From
Saudi Arabia to Spain, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2002, at A10.
92 A third party's advice, encouragement, inducement or support for a
tortious act may make that third party liable for that tortious act under a theory of
aiding and abetting or concert of action or the like, but the third party is not liable for
acts that were not reasonably foreseeable by him. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
876 cmt. d (1979). The same factors used to determine generally whether an
intervening cause is considered a superseding cause are used to determine the
foreseeability required for liability in the context of aiding and abetting. Id. §§ 442-
442B. It is possible that in interpreting "aiding and abetting" for purposes of these
plaintiffs' claims, the court will be guided by its interpretation of the Anti-Terrorism
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-39 (2001), relied on by the plaintiffs and construed by another
court to permit civil tort aiding and abetting liability. Plaintiffs Complaint at 82, Boim
v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1015-21 (7th Cir. 2002). On aiding and
abetting in the context of claims brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act, see Anthony
J. Sebok, Should American Courts Punish Multinational Companies for their Actions
Overseas?, Findlaw, available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20020729.html
(last visited Dec. 11, 2002).
93 The perceived exceptionality of the 9/11 attacks also contributes to
heightening emotional responses generally. See ORTONY ET AL., supra note 7, at 64-65.
94 Lerner et al., supra note 79 (manuscript at 9).
[Vol. 68: 4
EMOTIONS, RISK PERCEPTIONS AND BLAMING
"appropriate" emotional responses to the attacks-sympathy
for victims; determination in the face of adversity; communal
spirit; anger at perpetrators resolved into righteous
indignation-and this modeling may shape jurors' thinking
about which emotions they ought to take into account when
determining responsibility and damages in civil cases.
We also need to keep in mind the various contextual
factors that may moderate emotion and risk perception effects;
i.e., emotions, risk perception and blaming will influence one
another differently in different situations. The most likely
moderators, as noted earlier,95 will be: the identity of the
defendant(s) (i.e., Port Authority or Saudis); the legal theory of
recovery (e.g., negligence, aiding and abetting); the strength of
the parties' respective arguments; and the emotional tonality
encouraged by lawyers' case presentations (i.e., the ways they
weave the law and facts together into their narrative theories
of the case).
According to the research discussed earlier, the
generally negative valence of jurors' moods relating to 9/11
would be predicted to lead them to think more carefully about
their decision-making task. But, as noted earlier, recent
research suggests that only sadness, and not anger, will have
this effect.96 Now, while the precise mix of moods and emotions
9/11 jurors may experience is impossible to predict accurately,
it is likely to have something to do with what emotions the
lawyers tend to emphasize.97 To whose advantage would it be to
evoke one emotion or the other?
It might seem at first glance that the party with the
weaker evidence and argument would be advised to elicit
jurors' anger (so long as it can be diverted from the client), so
that jurors would consider the substance of the case less
carefully. Given what currently is known, this party appears to
be the plaintiffs in both cases.99 Conversely, to the extent that
95 See supra p. 961.
See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
97 Of course, the lawyers would be advised not to do this too overtly, because
rules of evidence and trial practice forbid undue, explicit appeals to jurors' emotions.
98 1 assume that emotion and risk perception effects would be largest where
the case is closely balanced and would diminish as the case becomes one-sided in either
direction. Cf., e.g., HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 164-66 (1966)
(stating that where evidence is closely balanced, jurors' emotions affect their verdicts
by leading them to construe evidence one way or the other). I further assume that if the
case gets to the jury, it is not entirely one-sided, or else the judge would already have
directed a verdict (or dismissed the case before trial on summary judgment). Within
this considerable range, based on the current state of information, I speculate that the
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the plaintiffs' case against the Port Authority depends on
jurors' careful consideration of somewhat counterintuitive
notions of legal responsibility-that the Port Authority should
be held liable for its negligence even though another party's
intervening intentional wrongdoing more immediately brought
about the harm 9 -the plaintiffs' lawyers may want to foster
the jurors' deliberate processing of the complex trial
information. The lawyers might do this either by specifically
seeking to elicit sadness or by relying on the dominantly
negative valence of jurors' less differentiated mood.
What about the attributional effects of particular
emotions? A good place to start is with jurors' likely sympathy
for the victims of 9/11, which may very well incline them to
attribute more responsibility for the tragedy to the defendants
in both cases than they would if not so moved. Three factors
enhance sympathy: the greater the extent of the suffering; '
the less the victims are themselves judged to be responsible for
their plight;' °1 and the more unusual the event leading to the
suffering."2 The victims of 9/11 should be highly sympathetic
on all counts. 103
According to Brian Bornstein's research, greater
sympathy for the victims should make jurors more likely to
hold the defendant responsible because sympathy inclines
observers to help, and jurors know the only way they can help a
tort plaintiff is by holding someone else liable.' 4 Paths one and
defendants will have the stronger case, apart from any of the potential effects
discussed here.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 (1979) (stating that if the
likelihood that a third person may act tortiously or even criminally is one of the
hazards that makes a person negligent, the fact that such a tortious or criminal act
occurs does not relieve the person of liability). I believe that jurors may find this
principle counterintuitive because their common sense will tell them that if a criminal
act more immediately brought about the plaintiffs' harm, the criminal should be the
blameworthy party. Compare the idea of "monocausality" discussed in FEIGENSON,
supra note 3, at 51-52. For an example of courts' awareness that juries may be prone to
consider one party's criminal culpability as relieving another party, negligent or
strictly liable, from responsibility for the event, see Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d
1332 (5th Cir. 1978).
t0o Bornstein, supra note 24.
101 WEINER, supra note 19, at 65.
102 Dale Miller et al., Counterfactual Thinking and Social Perception:
Thinking About What Might Have Been, in 23 ADVANCES IN EXP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 305
(Mark Zanna ed., 1990).
103 This sympathy, moreover, could very well be enhanced (or at least
sustained) in the local jury pool by the victims' stories featured in the New York Times
and elsewhere after 9/11.
104 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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two, described earlier, ° predict these influences of sympathy
on jurors' judgments. Confidence in the prediction is enhanced
for two reasons: The empirical support for these paths is more
extensive than for paths three and four;106 and the intrinsic
nature of the source of the emotion may make jurors less
inclined to disregard the resulting emotional influence even if
so instructed. Yet, at least with regard to the Port Authority,
jurors may very well also feel some sympathy for the
defendant-the Port Authority, after all, had offices in the
World Trade Center and lost employees in the attack-and
greater sympathy for the defendant may mean less sympathy
for the plaintiff 7 and hence less anger at the defendant,
reducing blame.
Jurors' anger is a more complicated matter. At first
glance, we might assume that jurors' anger at the 9/11 attacks
would also incline them to blame the defendants in both cases.
The blameworthiness of the defendants' alleged conduct should
provoke anger, more so in the case of allegedly intentional
wrongdoing (the Saudi defendants) than in the case of allegedly
negligent wrongdoing (the Port Authority). 8 The catastrophic
harm caused by the attack may also increase jurors' anger,0 9
and according to the research, anger will make jurors likelier to
blame the party they hold responsible for that harm,"0 which
will be the defendants, if anyone, not the plaintiffs. Paths one
and two, at least, appear to support these effects. Moreover, the
complementarity of jurors' emotional responses"' predicts that
the great sympathy jurors are likely to feel toward the victims
of 9/11 may indicate more anger toward the defendant, and
thus, more blame for the defendant."2
105 See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
106 id.
17 Although we did not find that more sympathy for one party meant less for
the other, Feigenson et al., supra note 26, at 592, Brian Bornstein has found this in one
study. Brian Bornstein, David, Goliath, and Revered Bayes: Prior Beliefs About
Defendants' Status in Personal Injury Cases, 8 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 233
(1994).
"o See FRITZ HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 113-14
(1958) (discussing levels of personal responsibility).
109 ORTONY ET AL., supra note 7.
Feigenson et al., supra note 26; Keltner et al., supra note 33.
See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
This is a likelier outcome than the other possible configuration of
sympathy and anger mentioned earlier-that sympathy for the victim might be
trumped by anger toward the victim arising from defensive attribution-because there
does not seem to be any plausible psychological basis for jurors to derogate or otherwise
distance themselves from the victims of the 9/11 attacks. Indeed, people's spontaneous
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To pursue this further, we need to return to the
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic emotion sources. I
assume that the terrorists will be the focal point for jurors'
most intense anger. It is unclear, though, whether jurors' likely
anger at the terrorists should be considered intrinsic or
extrinsic. This anger appears intrinsic in that it is provoked by
the events at issue, considered as a whole, as opposed to some
obviously judgment-irrelevant stimulus.11 But the anger may
also be considered extrinsic because the terrorists are not
parties and thus are not an explicit judgment target.1 4
To the extent that the source of jurors' anger is
considered to be extrinsic because it is directed at the terrorists
rather than the defendants, and jurors do not recognize it as
such, it may bias their judgments toward blame through either
the appraisal tendency (path three)"5  or the affect-as-
information process (path four),"6 regardless of who the
defendants are. But if, as may be expected, the defendants'
lawyers in both cases try to call jurors' attention to the
terrorists as the "real" source of jurors' angry responses, then
jurors may recognize the source of their anger as extrinsic: not
the defendant. Any misattribution of the anger to the judgment
target should be eliminated. Therefore, the informational value
of the extrinsic emotion-i.e., jurors blaming the judgment
target more because their current anger tells them that "this
person is blameworthy, deserving of punishment"-should
disappear.
We would then be left with the appraisal tendency
process. According to the study that most unambiguously
supports this model in the context of attributions of
responsibility,"7 anger biases people toward blaming others for
bad outcomes because it makes more salient the role of human
beings as causes of harm where both situational and human
responses in the form of memorials and repeated media coverage have displayed and
encouraged precisely the opposite phenomenon: enhanced empathy and sympathy for
the victims.
13 As in the classic affect-as-information and appraisal tendency studies; see
supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
114 It could be that the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is not always as tidy in
real cases, especially complex, high-profile cases like these, as it is in the psychology
lab, and that the lawyers' case presentation strategies will have something to do with
whether jurors treat anger at the terrorists as one or the other (as I discuss below).
"' See, e.g., Keltner et al., supra note 33.
See, e.g., Schwarz & Clore, Mood and Misattribution, supra note 41.
117 Keltner et al., supra note 33.
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factors are plausible targets of attribution.1i In both kinds of
9/11 cases, however, the role of human causes of disaster-the
terrorists-is already highly salient. Appraisal tendency could,
presumably, also explain bias arising from the heightened
salience of other components of anger's cognitive structure,
such as the severity of the outcome. But here, too, the horrific
consequences are already obvious. So the appraisal tendency
model generates the possibly counterintuitive prediction that
anger at the terrorists, recognized as such, would not have
much of an effect on jurors' judgments because there is little or
no room for that emotional bias to operate."9
Nevertheless, I think that jurors' anger will matter, and
that its effect will be moderated by (among other things) the
identity of the defendant and the plaintiffs' legal theory.
Consider the case against the Saudis. The plaintiffs' legal
strategy in a claim for aiding and abetting or concert of action
is to join the defendants with the terrorists in a kind of
common enterprise. This is most explicit in the plaintiffs' count
of conspiracy. These causes of action link the defendants to the
terrorists. Jurors may thus be encouraged to view their anger
at the causes of the 9/11 attack as intrinsic, not extrinsic. If
this is the case, then the effect of anger will not depend on
priming or appraisal tendency mechanisms. To the contrary,
the emotional signal the anger provides will be viewed as
informative of the judgment to be made, along paths one and/or
two.
Another psychological process, assimilation and
contrast, may help us to understand this. Assimilation and
contrast effects can occur whenever a target (here, the Saudis)
is evaluated differently in the presence of other targets than it
would be alone-either more like those other targets in the
case of assimilation, or more unlike them in the case of
contrast.12 The upshot for the case against the Saudis is that
jurors may be led to assimilate the defendants to the terrorists
and thus get angrier at the defendants (and, consequently,
"l8 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
"9 This might also be described as a "ceiling effect": Because the values on the
blameworthiness and severity scales are already so high, they're close to the ceiling
that jurors could plausibly assign to them, leaving little room for the influence of other
variables.
120 Norbert Schwarz & Herbert Bless, Constructing Reality and Its
Alternatives: An Inclusion/Exclusion Model of Assimilation and Contrast Effects in
Social Judgment, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL JUDGMENTS 217 (Leonard Martin
& Abraham Tesser eds., 1992).
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blame them more) than they otherwise would-anger and
blame for which the terrorists are the "proper" target. In
addition, angry jurors are likelier to engage in stereotyping. 121
Stereotyping would probably work to the advantage of the
plaintiffs in the case against the Saudis but not in the case
against the Port Authority, both because jurors' anger may be
greater against the Saudis (for the reasons just explained) and
because the defendants' ethnicity will provide more salient cues
for stereotyping.
Conversely, in the case against the Port Authority,
anger at the terrorists may not lead to more anger at the
defendant, because jurors are likelier to regard the source of
their anger as extrinsic to the target. That anger, therefore,
should not be regarded as informative of the decision; i.e., path
four, the affect-as-information model, should not be implicated.
Further, because appraisal tendency effects (path three) may
be minimized by the pre-existing salience of the severity and
human causes of the harm, that process is not likely to be very
influential either. 1
22
Indeed, anger at the terrorists may even lead to less
anger at the Port Authority, due to assimilation and contrast
effects. If one defines the category of surrounding judgment
targets to include the terrorists, jurors may readily contrast the
defendant to those obviously more culpable persons, which
should reduce the level of blame attributed to the defendant
(compared to the blame that would attach in the absence of a
salient comparison category).12 Similarly, once the terrorists
are a salient comparison, lawyers for the Port Authority may
encourage jurors to assimilate the Port Authority instead to the
innocent plaintiffs ("We're all unsuspecting victims of this
terrible attack"), which would be harder to do without the
terrorists as a foil.124 The complementarity of emotional
21 See Bodenhausen et al., supra note 17.
122 See supra notes 60, 118-19 and accompanying text.
'23 The Port Authority's lawyers might benefit from the extrinsic anger source
even beyond what the contrast effect suggests: In a kind of "reverse misattribution,"
they may be able to get jurors to misattribute their intrinsic anger to the obvious
extrinsic source, reducing the former. Cf. supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
124 Contrast effects may also help the defendant in another way: Jurors may
contrast the plaintiffs to those victims who have accepted Victim's Compensation Fund
payouts in lieu of suing and trying to recover even more. See, e.g., David W. Chen,
Fund for Terror Attack Victims Offers Awards in 14 Test Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30,
2002, at B1. Considering popular mythologies of tort plaintiffs, they may conclude that
the plaintiffs are greedy, perhaps even un-American, and thus, undeserving. See, e.g.,
Valerie Hans & William Lofquist, Jurors' Judgments of Business Liability in Tort
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responding may also lead jurors to contrast the defendants
with the terrorists: The angrier jurors are at the terrorists, the
less anger and more sympathy they may feel for others
involved in the tragedy, and the Port Authority, after all, was
victim as well as possible tortfeasor.
121
On the other hand, jurors' anger may work against the
Port Authority. First, outcome severity may be regarded as an
intrinsic anger source that biases judgments through path two.
Second, under the relevant law of apportionment of liability, in
which jurors will be instructed, a defendant whose negligence
consists of failing to protect the plaintiffs from a specific risk of
intentional wrongdoing is liable for the intentional wrongdoer's
share of responsibility as well as its own.2 ' This law may
prompt jurors to attribute to the Port Authority not only the
blame but also (some of) the anger they feel toward the
terrorists, in effect leading jurors to treat that anger as
intrinsic. Third, even to the extent that jurors regard their
anger at the terrorists as extrinsic, they may be at least partly
unaware of some residual anger,127 which may then affect their
judgments through either affect as information or appraisal
tendency. Fourth, for jurors to integrate their emotions
(specifically anger), cognitions and judgment into a relatively
Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 85 (1992).
Cf. Philip K. Howard, Facing the Limits of Law, and of Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21,
2002, at A15 (arguing that lawsuits by 9/11 victims are futile because dollars can't
make up for lost lives, will "harm all of society" by draining resources from other uses
and fomenting bitterness, and should be prohibited by Congress).
125 See supra notes 67-68. Relatedly, according to the cognitive heuristic of
monocausality, one sufficient cause (the terrorists) tends to occupy the attributional
field and reduce blaming of others. See FEIGENSON, supra note 3, at 51-52.
126 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 14 (2000) (discussing apportionment of
liability). If a person is liable based on a failure to protect another from the specific risk
of an intentional harm, that person is jointly and severally liable for the share of
responsibility assigned to the intentional tortfeasor. (I thank Brad Saxton for pointing
this out to me.) Under New York law, non-parties can be assigned a percentage of
comparative responsibility for plaintiffs' non-economic losses, but the Port Authority
will not be able to reduce its liability for these losses by any percentage of fault
attributed to the terrorists if, as seems likely, the plaintiffs, after exercising due
diligence, will not be able to get jurisdiction over the terrorists. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1601
(2003); see also Siler v. 146 Montague Assocs., 228 A.D.2d 33, 38-41, 652 N.Y.S.2d 315,
319-21 (2d Dep't 1997) (ruling that negligent defendant may seek apportionment of
liability against non-party intentional tortfeasor, but not if the plaintiff shows that
with due diligence it was unable to obtain jurisdiction over the non-party). It is possible
that jurisdiction will be obtainable over other arguably culpable persons besides the
terrorists (e.g., one or more of those named as defendants in the case against the
Saudis).
M See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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satisfying whole, 2' they may be inclined to do something and
blame someone. The only targets for blame before the court in
this case would be the plaintiffs and the defendant Port
Authority, and as between the two of them, the defendant will
be a far more likely candidate for blaming.
Fear or anxiety may also have ramifications for blaming
as indicated by terror management theory. Under this theory,
the effects are very likely to be moderated by the defendant's
identity: Any such effects are likely to be seen in the case
against the Saudis and not the case against the Port Authority.
Jurors whose mortality is made salient to them-and no event
in recent American history has done this more emphatically
than the 9/11 attacks-are more inclined toward nationalistic
impulses and more inclined to punish a blameworthy member
of an outgroup than a member of an ingroup who has behaved
identically.'29 Obviously, the Saudi defendants would more
readily be classified as outgroup members than would the Port
Authority.
130
Terror management theory also predicts a greater
inclination on the part of those who are made to think about
their own mortality to punish those who transgress against
cultural symbols. The World Trade Center was certainly such a
symbol, one of American capitalist wealth and might, which is
why the terrorists twice chose it as a target.13' The Saudi
defendants are especially vulnerable to this effect because it
will be easier to portray them as belonging to an outgroup.
Indeed, the Saudis could potentially be assimilated to the
specific outgroup (fundamentalist terrorists) who have been
challenging another, even more treasured cultural symbol: the
American flag. 132
128 See FEIGENSON, supra note 3, at 107.
129 Nelson et al., supra note 52.
130 Similarly, the racial stereotyping that mortality salience increases would
also be predicted to work against the Saudi defendants and not the Port Authority. See
supra note 121 and accompanying text.
131 See, e.g., Stephen Labaton & Jonathan D. Glater, Twin Towers at Center of
Legal Brawl, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2001, at C1 (quoting leaseholder of World Trade
Center as saying, "What these terrorists have tried to do is destroy the symbol of...
our economic progress, our strength, our way of life").
132 Consider the prominence of the flag in post-9/11 events, from the one(s)
recovered at the World Trade Center site, to the ones used to drape coffins of police
officers and firefighters who died there, to the ubiquitous images of the flag in
television programs and videos about 9/11; and consider also the televised images,
going back at least to Iran in 1979, of Islamic fundamentalist protesters burning
American flags.
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B. Risk Perceptions and Attributions of Responsibility and
Blame in 9/11 Cases
Jurors' risk perceptions are likely to affect and be
affected by their emotions and to play a role in how they assign
blame for 9/11. Here again, the defendants' identity will be
important: Risk perception effects are much likelier to occur in
the case against the Port Authority than in the case against the
Saudis. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, jurors'
emotions will lead them to take the risk of terrorism very
seriously and to favor taking significant steps to reduce that
risk. Second, the hindsight bias may lead them to think that
such steps should have been taken before 9/11, and to blame
the defendant for not having done so.
Jurors' perceptions regarding the risk of terrorism are
likely to engender fear, as indicated by the psychometric model.
Terrorist threats rank high on the dread dimension: People
sense that they have little control over the prototypical feared
attack (a plane used as a missile, a bomb), and the
consequences of a terrorist attack could very well be
catastrophic, as 9/11 was. Terrorist threats are also feared
because they are unknown. Of course, people now have a sense
of what can happen (e.g., a suicide bomber), but the various
possibilities are beyond comprehension. What, for instance,
would a release of toxic chemicals in the middle of a city be
like? Moreover, the sheer variety of possible methods of attack,
plus the complete uncertainty about where and when such an
attack might occur, make the specific threat an unknown."'
There may even be a kind of feedback loop, in which the dread
and unknown nature of the terrorism risk enhances people's
fear, which in turn leads them to be even more pessimistic
about the prospects of a terrorist attack (which leads them to
be even more fearful, and so on).'
"' The government's vague warnings about "terror alerts" may well have
served to increase this sense that the risk is unknown-even by experts.
134 Recall that Lerner and her colleagues found that fearful people (as opposed
to angry people) tend to think that another terrorist attack is more likely. See Lerner et
al., supra note 79. Lerner and Keltner found that fearful people make more pessimistic
risk estimates (and angry people, less pessimistic ones) only when the predicted event
is ambiguous with regard to perceived certainty and controllability. Lerner & Keltner,
supra note 34, at 151-52. I have argued that terrorist attacks are uncertain and
uncontrollable, but I suppose it could be argued that they are ambiguous at least in
terms of controllability-they are unknown but people may believe that they, or the
government, can control their likelihood-which would make these emotion effects
more likely to occur.
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One might think that people's elevated perceptions of
terrorism and other risks35 would be attenuated as time
passes, since the likeliest explanation for the heightened risk
perceptions is the availability of words and images about the
attacks in the media, which were most pronounced in the
immediate aftermath of the attacks. It is very likely, however,
that by the time of any trial in a 9/11 case, media coverage will
have kept the risk of terrorism salient, thus reinforcing how
seriously people take that risk. Every juror will have seen
repeated images of the attacks, both at the time and in
television specials and print media coverage since. In addition,
media coverage of the war against terrorism (in all its many
guises, in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, including perhaps
also coverage of suicide bombings in the Middle East) will serve
to keep the idea of the 9/11 attacks in the foreground of public
awareness.136 Moreover, media coverage that emphasizes the
risks of terrorism, as opposed to the costs of avoiding those
risks, would be predicted to underscore this perception."7
Research consistent with the psychometric approach
shows that the more a risk is dreaded, the greater the support
for strict regulation to reduce or eliminate the risk."8 And with
regard to an "off the charts" risk like that of a terrorist attack,
jurors may well believe that the risk is to be avoided at
(almost) any cost, especially if most of those costs (e.g., defense
budget expenditures, infringement of civil liberties) remain
"off-screen" for most jurors."9
In addition to these risk perception habits, jurors are
susceptible to the hindsight bias. Their judgments of the ex
ante likelihood or foreseeability of an event are influenced by
knowing the ex post outcome (whether the event occurred or
15 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
136 This is not to say that media coverage will provide the exclusive frame for
perceptions of the risks of terrorism, especially in New York City, where just about
everyone in the jury pool will have visited Ground Zero or at least looked at the skyline
since 9/11 and reflected on the destruction of the buildings.
137 In the absence of a systematic content analysis, I cannot say that media
coverage of terrorism has been biased in the way that, say, Dan Bailis and I found
regarding coverage of air bag safety, but I conjecture that the same slant toward the
risks (or the benefits, as opposed to the costs, of risk avoidance) would be found.
Feigenson & Bailis, supra note 86. Certainly, it seems that this slant characterizes the
current administration's rhetoric, and hence most media coverage, of the recent
invasion of Iraq-a leading rationale for which is a supposed risk avoidance benefit,
reducing the likelihood of future terrorist attacks against the United States.
138 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
139 Cf. MARGOLIS, supra note 72 (offering a "risk matrix" approach to the
understanding divergence between lay and expert risk perceptions).
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not). Studies show that the hindsight bias affects mock jurors'
tort decisions. In determining whether someone should have
foreseen that harm might occur-an essential component of
negligence liability-jurors are influenced by knowing that the
harm did occur.14° In this situation, the hindsight bias would
make jurors more likely to think that the Port Authority should
have known that a catastrophic terrorist attack might occur. If
we presume that jurors may believe that practically no
precaution would be deemed too great in the face of such a
serious risk, jurors may well believe that a party who failed to
do more to avoid that risk should be blamed for not having
done so."'
This line of thinking-from dreaded risk to fear to even
more dreaded risk, and from that to increased blaming via the
hindsight bias-is not, however, likely to be much of a factor in
the case against the Saudis. There, the alleged misconduct that
claims of aiding and abetting or conspiracy evoke looks much
more like intentional wrongdoing. The main issue is not so
much whether the Saudi defendants should have foreseen the
attacks, but how closely connected they were to the actual
perpetrators. 142 If the plaintiffs' argument is that the Saudis are
liable because they tried to help bring about a particular
action, the foreseeability of that action seems beside the
point.
4 1
140 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in
Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998); see also FEIGENSON, supra note 3, at 62-64.
1 Another theoretically possible effect of fear on jurors' decision making can
be discounted: It is unlikely that jurors' fear will lead to defensive attribution, the
distancing or even angry response that could override jurors' great sympathy for the
victims. First, it may be that fear leads to victim-blaming only when there is some
plausible basis for blame. In our first comparative negligence study, for instance, we
found that participants attributed some fault even to victims in the low-
blameworthiness condition, whose conduct was designed to be legally blameless. See
Feigenson et al., supra note 63. There were gaps in our brief scenario, however, that
participants plausibly could have filled in with victim behavior that would warrant
blame. In the case of 9/11, most if not all occupants of the World Trade Center were
obviously innocent. There would seem to be no psychologically plausible way for
observers to hold them responsible for what happened (except, perhaps, with regard to
particular victims who are known to have delayed leaving their offices or to have
returned for no good reason). It is also possible that any tendency toward defensive
attribution and its emotional distancing of observers from victims will be overcome by
the communal and patriotic fervor engendered by 9/11. It may be harder to maintain
(even subconsciously) an "us-them" attitude after months of genuine (and media-
encouraged) rallying together.
142 As noted supra note 92, the foreseeability of the harmful act does limit the
liability of one who allegedly aided and abetted that act.
143 Not only jurors' fear, but also their anger may, via their risk perceptions,
affect their inclination to blame. It might seem that jurors' anger would lead to less
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C. Debiasing Jurors in 9/11 Cases
Before drawing conclusions about the possible role of
emotions and risk perceptions in 9/11 cases, it is important to
consider the likelihood that jurors, pursuant to the judge's
instructions or otherwise, will be able to avoid or reduce any
unwanted influence of their emotions on their responsibility
judgments.144 Generally speaking, the research on debiasing (or
correction) indicates that in order to purge judgments of
unwanted bias, the decision maker must be: (i) aware of the
unwanted influence; (ii) motivated to correct the bias; (iii)
aware of the magnitude and direction of the bias; and (iv) able
to adjust the response appropriately. 145
blaming in this regard: Angry people make more optimistic risk estimates, and thus
are less likely to elevate the likelihood of a terrorist attack. See supra notes 76-77 and
accompanying text. This, in turn, would be predicted to make them less susceptible to
believing that no precaution is too great when terrorism is the threat, which, in turn,
may make them less likely to judge in hindsight that the defendant is to blame for not
having foreseen the risk and not having done more to protect against it. But recall that
the reason that angry people make more optimistic risk estimates is that experiencing
the emotion primes them to perceive risks as controllable and/or certain. See supra
note 77 and accompanying text. And the likelier jurors are to believe that the risk was
controllable, the more likely they are to believe (in hindsight) that the defendant
should have controlled for it. Again, this line of thinking seems to be especially
applicable to the Port Authority, because with regard to the Saudi defendants, the
claim is not that they could have controlled the risk and failed to but instead that they
deliberately helped to create (and realize) the risk. Note also that Lerner and her
colleagues recently found that it was angry people, not fearful people, who were most
supportive of punitive measures to reduce the risk of terrorism. See supra note 83 and
accompanying text.
144 As noted supra note 18, I am not directly addressing whether emotions
should be regarded as an "unwanted influence" on legal judgment; I am simply
outlining how jurors would have to go about reducing that influence if they did
perceive it to be unwanted.
14' Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental
Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL.
117 (1994); Timothy D. Wilson et al., Mental Contamination and the Debiasing
Problem, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra
note 41, at 185. In addition, people who try to respond to bias in their decision-making
processes do so in accordance with their naive theories regarding the source and extent
of the bias. This is explained by Richard Petty and Duane Wegener's "flexible
correction model." Richard E. Petty & Duane T. Wegener, Flexible Correction Processes
in Social Judgment: Correcting for Context-Induced Contrast, 29 J. EXP. SOC. PSYCHOL.
137 (1993); Duane T. Wegener & Richard E. Petty, The Flexible Correction Model: The
Role of Nave Theories of Bias in Bias Correction, in 29 ADVANCES EXP. SOC. PSYCHOL.
141 (1997) [hereinafter The Flexible Correction Model]. Other research, however,
indicates that if an instruction to adjust or correct for bias is sufficiently blatant,
people will correct their judgment in the direction suggested by the instruction rather
than in accordance with any intuitive theory regarding the bias. Diederik A. Stapel et
al., The Smell of Bias: What Instigates Correction Processes in Social Judgments?, 24
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 797, 801-03 (1998).
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Not all jurors' judgments will be strongly
"contaminated" by emotional influence.146 A number of factors
should mitigate contamination. For instance, voir dire should
exclude at least some of the most evidently biased prospective
jurors.147 Judicial pre-instruction, where available, also may
help focus jurors more on the applicable legal rules and less on
the lawyers' emotion-laden stories of the case. Additionally,
adversarial argument, judicial instructions to jurors not to use
their emotions in deciding 8 and group deliberations may
prompt jurors to engage in correction processes."'
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that 9/11 jurors will be able to
adjust their judgments appropriately to correct for all
emotional influences.
First, jurors may perceive no need to correct for bias
("Despite what the judge is saying, my emotional reactions
aren't influencing my judgment"). These jurors are likely to
remain unaware of many sources of unwanted influence on or
"mental contamination" of their decision making, if only
because people usually believe that their own thinking and
judgments are unbiased." ° This may be especially true in the
case against the Port Authority, in which emotions other than
sympathy may be less salient."' They may also (perhaps
incorrectly) believe that they have already (properly) put aside
any extrinsic emotional responses in compliance with the
judge's instructions.
Second, jurors may not be motivated to correct for any
emotional influence, believing that taking at least certain
146 "Contamination" refers to the title of Wilson and Brekke's leading article
on the subject. See Wilson & Brekke, supra note 145.
147 I thank Brad Saxton for suggesting this point.
148 See supra note 18.
149 Each of these potential sources of debiasing, however, may also increase
rather than decrease the role of jurors' emotions in their decisions. Lawyers may use
voir dire to begin presenting their theories of the case, with all their emotional
ramifications; judicial pre-instruction may frame the case for the jurors in a way that
draws out their emotions (e.g., in addressing whether the fault of non-party intentional
tortfeasors may be taken into account, the judge may enhance assimilation and/or
contrast effects and their emotional implications, discussed supra notes 120, 123-24
and accompanying text); adversarial argument may emphasize as well as attenuate
emotion-provoking factors; and the support of fellow jurors during deliberations for a
given juror's own emotion-driven positions may increase the strength of that juror's
commitment to those positions.
150 Wilson et al., supra note 145, at 189-90.
151 See Stapel et al., supra note 145, at 801-03 (finding that participants who
received "subtle" instruction to adjust for context-driven bias in their judgments if they
should perceive any adjusted only when that bias was salient).
20031
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
emotional responses into account-such as their sympathy for
accident victims-is proper.'52 Third, jurors may not want to
correct for the effects of the fear of mortality described by
terror management theory, precisely because the self-protective
mechanisms that mortality salience triggers-such as blaming
outgroup members-are so highly motivated.'53 Fourth, judicial
instructions to disregard emotional influence may even lead to
a "paradoxical" effect in which that influence is enhanced, not
diminished, due to the increased availability of the proscribed
influence."'
Fifth, jurors may not know how to adjust appropriately
even if they perceive the need to debias and are motivated to
try. 155 For instance, decision makers who are made highly
aware of their feelings and are highly motivated to reach a fair
and accurate decision may overcorrect for any emotional
influence.'56  This happens when people overestimate, in
accordance with their naive views of their own cognitive
processes,'57 how much their feelings are distorting their
judgment, and consequently overadjust to achieve the correct
result they seek."' Overcorrection may also occur as a
consequence of the demand characteristic of the situation:
Sufficiently blatant instructions not to be influenced by a given
contextual feature may lead people to presume that their
judgments have been so influenced, regardless of whether they
actually were, and to instigate the (unnecessary) correction
process."' Overcorrection is very possible, for instance, with
regard to jurors' awareness of their sympathy for 9/11 victims:
Their emotion will be strong and they may very well (correctly)
'5' See FEIGENSON, supra note 3, at 37-38.
,53 See supra p. 975.
"4 Kari Edwards & Tamara Bryan, Judgmental Biases Produced by
Instructions to Disregard: The (Paradoxical) Case of Emotional Information, 23
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 849 (1997).
..' See Wilson & Brekke, supra note 145.
'56 Leonard Berkowitz et al., On the Correction of Feeling-Induced Judgmental
Biases, in FEELING AND THINKING, supra note 34, at 131.
,57 Wegener & Petty, The Flexible Correction Model, supra note 145; Wilson &
Brekke, supra note 145.
'8 This may occur because jurors, without being aware of it, already implicitly
adjusted for the unwanted influence. Wilson et al., supra note 145.
159 Stapel et al., supra note 145, The typical judicial instructions to disregard
emotional influence seem closer to the "blatant" than the "subtle" instruction condition
in Stapel et al.'s study, which suggests the viability of the overcorrection hypothesis. It
is unclear, however, whether this possible effect would outweigh the contrary reasons
to predict undercorrection or no correction. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying
text.
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believe that sympathy may bias their judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants, yet they may
overestimate the extent of that bias. Overcorrection for the
perceived biasing effects of anger is especially likely in the case
against the Saudis, in which that and other emotions are likely
to be more salient.
Conversely, there is some evidence that jurors can
follow instructions not to let their emotions improperly
influence them. David DeSteno and his colleagues found that
participants with high need for cognition could avoid the
biasing effects of emotion on risk perception when instructed to
be careful and accurate (and where the emotion manipulation
was very salient).16 Moreover, knowing that one will be
accountable for one's decision has been shown to attenuate the
effect of extrinsic emotional influence on that decision,
specifically, anger leading to punitiveness. 161 Yet, the emotion
source in that study was extrinsic and participants knew that
it was. Accountability may not have the same effect with
regard to either intrinsic or unrecognized extrinsic emotional
influences.'62
160 DeSteno et al., supra note 45, at 407-11. Note that of the studies that have
found emotion effects on social judgments, including judgments of responsibility and
blame, some-especially those illustrating path two-included more or less realistic
instructions to participants not to use their emotions in making their decisions; others,
especially those illustrating the extrinsic emotion effects described in paths three and
four, did not. See supra notes 19-46 and accompanying text. So the research is not yet
conclusive that emotion may affect legal judgments through any or all of the four
paths, notwithstanding judicial instructions to the contrary. However, the literature on
jurors' willingness and ability in general to follow limiting instructions and
instructions to disregard, and the research finding paradoxical effects for instructions
to disregard emotion, support the thrust of my claim that such instructions are likely
not to be effective as intended. The likelihood that jurors' emotions in actual 9/11 cases
would be much stronger than those induced experimentally in the studies cited also
supports the claim. See, e.g., Saul Kassin & Christina Studebaker, Instructions to
Disregard and the Jury: Curative and Paradoxical Effects, in INTENTIONAL
FORGETTING: INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES 413 (Jonathan M. Golding & Colin M.
MacLeod eds., 1998); Edwards & Bryan, supra note 154.
161 Lerner et al., supra note 16, at 568-72.
162 On the other hand, in Second Sober Thought, Lerner et al. explain that the
effect of accountability on emotional influence seems to have been mediated by
systematic rather than heuristic or automatic thinking. Id. at 571. For example,
accountability attenuated anger-driven punitiveness, not by reducing the anger
participants felt, but by influencing how they dealt with that anger. So their findings
regarding accountability may generalize to other emotion sources.
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CONCLUSION
The preceding analysis is subject to some limitations.
First, I have greatly oversimplified my discussion of mood and
emotion effects on social judgment. Emotions and moods are
very complicated in themselves; they are especially complicated
when, as here, so many different emotions and moods are likely
to be involved. Further, moods and emotions work together
with other cognitive and social psychological phenomena (e.g.,
availability, norm theory, assimilation and contrast), some of
which I have mentioned in passing, others not at all. Moreover,
the research on the effects of emotion on social judgments,
while more developed than it was fifteen years ago, is still very
fragmentary. Some aspects of the models I use here as a basis
for inferences or predictions about legal decision making are at
present directly supported by only one or two studies, or only
indirectly supported. Therefore, any inferences from the
research to outcomes in particular cases must remain
tentative.
Second, I have spoken very generally about hypothetical
9/11 cases. A basic finding of social psychology, however, is that
human judgment and behavior is highly dependent on the
situation in which people find themselves.'63 As noted, relevant
contexts that must be considered include the defendants'
identities, the nature of the plaintiffs' legal theories and the
strength of each side's proof and arguments, as well as the
broader context of previous and continuing media coverage of
relevant events. It is especially hard to predict with any
assurance how the context in which relevant risks are
perceived may change by the time these cases go to trial:
Perhaps media coverage will by that point not emphasize the
risk of terrorism as much as it has, or perhaps the emphasis
will be even greater. Moreover, it is also difficult to predict the
particular facts that will emerge before or at trial that could
affect jurors' judgment (e.g., information suggesting
recklessness or knowing disregard of risks by the Port
Authority). Finally, jurors' emotional and cognitive responses
to the case and their legal judgments will depend in part on
how the lawyers for the respective parties frame their stories of
the plaintiffs, the defendant and the 9/11 attack. Although I
163 See, e.g., RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES
AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980); LEE Ross & RICHARD NISBETT, THE
PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1991).
1000 [Vol. 68: 4
EMOTIONS, RISK PERCEPTIONS AND BLAMING
have suggested some possible approaches here, we cannot
know precisely how the lawyers will strategize and present
their respective cases.
Third, I have not discussed individual differences in
emotional response and risk perception, which would of course
play a role in any jury determination.' The impact of 9/11 on
voir dire in other sorts of cases is already a matter of
speculation in the profession;'65 the impact on cases dealing
with 9/11 will obviously be significant. Nor have I addressed
the possible impact of deliberations on the decision-making
process.
Despite these limitations, I hope that this summary of
research on the emotions, risk perceptions and social
judgments has shed some light not only on the litigation that
has already begun in the wake of 9/11, but more generally on
decision making in more routine cases. I also hope that by
attempting to trace some of the complex connections among the
habits of thought and feeling that cognitive and social
psychologists have identified, I have indicated where further
empirical research is needed.
1 The venue of any 9/11 cases may affect jurors' emotional responses. For
instance, people geographically closer to the attacks may be relatively sadder and more
fearful because they are likelier to know family, friends or co-workers who died; in
those farther removed from the attacks, anger may be a more dominant emotion. (I
thank Linda Meyer for suggesting this.)
16' See, e.g., Mark Curriden, Violence Shaping Verdicts, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2002,
at 36 (discussing how 9/11 may be affecting jurors' views about crime and punishment).
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